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Research on confidence spreads across several sub-fields of psychology and neuroscience. Here, we
explore how a definition of confidence as Bayesian probability can unify these viewpoints. This computa-
tional view entails that there are distinct forms in which confidence is represented and used in the brain,
including distributional confidence, pertaining to neural representations of probability distributions, and
summary confidence, pertaining to scalar summaries of those distributions. Summary confidence is, norma-
tively, derived or ‘‘read out’’ from distributional confidence. Neural implementations of readout will trade off
optimality versus flexibility of routing across brain systems, allowing confidence to serve diverse cognitive
functions.The sense of confidence has been defined as ‘‘a belief about the
validity of our own thoughts, knowledge or performance that
relies on a subjective feeling’’ (Grimaldi et al., 2015). This psycho-
logical definition would not seem out of place in the late 19th
century, when psychologists began to ask human subjects
about their confidence to unravel the determinants of this feeling
(Peirce and Jastrow, 1884). Relatively recently, comparative
psychology opened the study of confidence to non-human ani-
mals (for a review, see Smith et al., 2003) and neuroscience
began to probe the electrophysiological underpinnings of confi-
dence in monkeys and rodents (Hampton, 2001; Kepecs et al.,
2008; Kiani and Shadlen, 2009). The translation of confidence
from psychology to neuroscience has revealed underlying insta-
bilities within the conceptual foundations of the still nascent area
of confidence studies. Psychological definitions, such as that
above, rely on concepts like ‘‘belief,’’ ‘‘feelings,’’ and ‘‘thought’’
that from a neuroscientific perspective pose unanswered trans-
lational challenges in themselves. Neuroscience definitions tend
toward the notion that brains represent and process information
using probabilistic codes at the level of populations of cells; their
relationship to the psychological definition has been unclear. We
hold that the study of confidence would benefit from a more uni-
fied framework that can provide more solid bridges between
psychology and neuroscience and between research in humans
and in other animals. Toward that end, in this review, we propose
a view of subjective confidence that emphasizes its diverse func-
tions and wide applicability tomany different forms of neural rep-
resentation and behavior. This view identifies both commonal-
ities and unique features across these forms and identifies the
importance of understanding the transformations among them.
In particular, we identify a distributional form of confidence that
pertains to probabilistic representations and a summary form
that pertains to scalar representations derived from those distri-
butions. We argue that recognizing this distinction and under-
standing the relationship between these two forms will help to78 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.reconcile several apparent controversies and to clarify the
agenda for future work in the field.
Formal Definitions and Outline of the Proposal Review
A general understanding of the notion of confidence is that it
fundamentally quantifies a degree of belief, or synonymously, a
degree of reliability, trustworthiness, certitude, or plausibility.
This common notion coincides closely with a formal one: that
of Bayesian probability. Although a probability is sometimes
considered to describe the likelihood of occurrence of random
events in the world, from the viewpoint of an observer, whether
such likelihoods constitute objective facts or reflect subjective
knowledge is indistinguishable. Thus, probabilities simply are
degrees of belief from the Bayesian viewpoint (Jaynes, 2003).
Recognizing that much remains to be unpacked, we adopt the
notion of Bayesian probability as the formal definition of subjec-
tive confidence.
From this modest premise, our seemingly lofty aim is to bridge
the gap between psychology on the one hand and neuroscience
on the other. The foundation for our approach is first to recognize
that, semantically, confidence is a property (degree, probability,
etc.) that describes or modifies a referent (belief, response,
memory, future event, etc.). Therefore it is impossible to refer
precisely to confidence without specifying the object to which
it pertains. In common usage the referent is often not made
explicit and this is likely to contribute to conceptual confusion.
We propose that the same general formal notion of confidence
as Bayesian probability can be applied to widely different struc-
tures and processes. These include populations of neurons, neu-
ral functions, behavioral outputs, persons, etc. Depending on the
nature of its referent there are specific and significant conse-
quences for the computational or conceptual definition and
treatment of each particular use of confidence (see Box 1: ‘‘Cur-
rent Status of the Field’’). Fleshing out this point is the thread that
ties together much of this review.
Box 1. Current Status of the Field
d Multiple domains. The sense of confidence characterizes
the reliability of internal representations in a variety
of cognitive domains, at least: perception, decision
accuracy, reward probability, general knowledge, and
memorization.
d Multiple manifestations. It can be probed experimentally
through several behavioral measures, explicit (verbal
reports, ratings, etc.) and implicit (choices, reaction
times, etc.).
d Multiple species. The implicit behavioral measures of con-
fidence demonstrate that the sense of confidence is not
specifically humans, but shared with other mammals like
monkeys and rodents.
d Multiple functions. The estimation of confidence canmodu-
late learning, information seeking and decision-making.
d Multiple processing steps. Confidence is estimated at
different stages of information processing: it may charac-
terize sensory inputs, a decision variable, a prediction, a
decision process, a post-decision evaluation.
d Different kinds of accuracies. The accuracy of confidence
can be assessed as an absolute estimate (whether it can
be mapped onto an objective variable) or as a relative es-
timate (whether trial-by-trial variations make sense).
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used in research on Bayesian neural computation (Fiser et al.,
2010; Ma and Jazayeri, 2014; Pouget et al., 2013) and the notion
of ‘‘confidence’’ used inmetacognitive research are two different
manifestations of the same concept of Bayesian probability.
First, we note that ‘‘uncertainty’’ and ‘‘confidence’’ are merely
the inverse (or reciprocal) of one another, so the choice of
emphasis is not an important difference. Instead, the critical dif-
ference is that ‘‘confidence’’ in the metacognitive field is a single
number, such as a numerical rating, whereas ‘‘uncertainty’’ in the
Bayesian computation field is a property of an array of numbers,
such as a distribution of firing rates across neurons. What we will
suggest is that the conceptual relationship between these two
forms of confidence (uncertainty) is very much the same as the
relationship between ‘‘summary statistics’’ (mean, standard de-
viation, etc.) and the data they describe. Summary statistics are
scalars and data are sets of distributions of numbers. We will
therefore borrow this terminology and refer to summary confi-
dence and distributional confidence. While in principle summary
confidence might share only a nominal relationship to distribu-
tional confidence, we argue that from a normative point of
view, summary confidence is derived within the brain from distri-
butional confidence, just as a statistician calculates the standard
deviation of a distribution. We term this process confidence
readout.
From this conceptual parcellation it becomes clear that recon-
ciling neuroscientific and psychological approacheswill hinge on
understanding the relationship between distributional and sum-
mary forms of confidence. Our strategy is as follows: first, in
Confidence and the Neural Representation of Uncertainty: Distri-
butions and Summaries we review briefly the Bayesian codingfield and important elements of this normative view that we
embrace. Next, in From Data to Summary: Reading out Sum-
mary Confidence from Distributions, we consider the problem
of readout of a summary from a computational perspective.
We suggest that understanding how summary confidence is
derived from distributional confidence is of great importance
for confidence research going forward. We then turn to look at
some of the diversity of uses of confidence in Uses of Summary
Confidence and Behavioral Manifestations, pointing out that
explicit reporting of confidence only scratches the surface of
the important uses of confidence in adaptive behavior, which
include critical functions such as setting learning rates and
setting evidence thresholds. In A Brain-Scale, Hierarchical Neu-
ral Architecture for Confidence we review attempts to map con-
fidence to neuronal substrates across different brain areas,
emphasizing the implications of the fact that neural circuits use
both distributional and summary representations of confidence.
Finally, in The Rough Edges, we discuss the relationship be-
tween Bayesian optimality seen in sensorimotor behaviors and
suboptimality seen in confidence reporting and other ‘‘high
level’’ behaviors, arguing that understanding how confidence
summaries are formed in the brain will help to illuminate the
latter.
Confidence and the Neural Representation of
Uncertainty: Distributions and Summaries
A central example of probabilistic computation is the problem of
combining different sources of information. Normatively, this
problem requires a solution in which each source is weighted
by its inverse uncertainty, or confidence (Jaynes, 2003; Knill
and Pouget, 2004; Ma et al., 2006; Pearl, 1997). This general
uncertainty-weighting problem is illustrated in Figure 1. This
problem occurs in cue combination, such as when inferring the
orientation of a bar given both visual and haptic sensory inputs.
At a behavioral level, human subjects are indeed close to optimal
when performing multi-sensory cue combination (Ernst and
Banks, 2002) and in sensorimotor integration (Körding and Wol-
pert, 2004; Todorov, 2004; Wolpert and Ghahramani, 2000). This
raises the natural question of how such probabilistic computa-
tions take place in the brain.
Several prominent theories in computational neuroscience
posit that computations and information processing in brain
circuits are essentially probabilistic, or Bayesian. These theories
are strongly normative because computing on probability distri-
butions is considered to be the optimal solution.
A prominent computational theory of how brains implement
normative solutions is known as probabilistic population coding.
This theory suggests that neurons encode parameters of proba-
bility distributions (Knill and Pouget, 2004). Thus, tuning curves
are interpreted as likelihood detectors: a neuron tuned to a
particular orientation signals the likelihood that the stimulus
has this orientation, and a population of neurons tuned to
different orientations represents the full probability distribution
of the orientation of the stimulus (see Figure 2A), thus forming
a probabilistic population code (Deneve et al., 1999; Ma et al.,
2006). Another theory, known as Bayesian sampling theory, is
similar in spirit to probabilistic population coding but different
in details. Sampling theory proposes that neurons encodeNeuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 79
Figure 1. Confidence in a Combination of Inputs
The left plot shows the optimal combination (in yellow) of two input probability
distributions (blue and red). Confidence can be read out as the precision of the
distributions (their inverse variance). Note that confidence-weighting of infor-
mation entails that the output distribution (yellow) is closer to the more precise
(red) distribution. This optimal combination corresponds to different situations
in practice. In the perceptual domain, the input datamay be the orientation of a
bar provided by visual and tactile information; and the output data the multi-
modal integration. In the learning domain, the input data may be prior infor-
mation and current likelihood conveyed by sensory data, and the output data
the posterior estimate. The right plot shows that the precision of the combined
distribution is higher than that of the input distributions. When distributions are
Gaussians as here, the combination of precision is exactly additive.
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Hoyer and Hyvärinen, 2003; Lee and Mumford, 2003). The activ-
ity of a neuron at a particular moment is thus interpreted as a
sample from the inferred variable, such as the orientation of a
stimulus.
We refer the reader to several reviews for more details and
discussion about the relative merit of each theory (Fiser
et al., 2010; Pouget et al., 2013; Ma and Jazayeri, 2014). For
our purposes it is worth highlighting a few key points. First,
because these theories posit that activity in neural populations
represents (approximately) entire probability distributions,
these representations inherently convey confidence informa-
tion. We call this implicit representation of confidence distribu-
tional confidence. Second, these theories have not yet been
empirically validated. Because we know that behavior can in
some cases take into account uncertainty (Ernst and Banks,
2002; Körding and Wolpert, 2004; Ma and Jazayeri, 2014;
Maloney and Zhang, 2010), we know that some kind of prob-
abilistic representation must exist, but it need not be a full
probability distribution (e.g., Rich et al., 2015). One alternative
to the idea of neural codes based on probability distributions
are codes in which summary statistics, such as the mean
and variance, are represented and computed independently.
While arguably less parsimonious, there is some evidence to
support representations along these lines (e.g., O’Reilly
et al., 2013). As we will argue, we believe it is likely that
both such codes (as well as others) co-exist in the brain, in
particular if one considers different stages of information pro-
cessing. We present in From Data to Summary: Reading out
Summary Confidence from Distributions the notion of readout:
a process that extracts summary statistics from distributional
representations.80 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.A third point is that these theories have so far been explored
and tested mostly in the domain of perceptual processing (Bej-
janki et al., 2011; Berkes et al., 2011; Deneve et al., 1999; Fiser
et al., 2010; Kim and Basso, 2010; Ma et al., 2006). It remains
an open question to what extent probabilistic computation holds
beyond low-level sensory and motor representations: e.g.,
the belief that ‘‘it may rain tomorrow,’’ a reward expectation,
etc. Forming probability distributions by simulating internal
models could serve as the basis for a distributional neural re-
presentation of confidence in a variety of problems. There do
exist a number of models for higher-level computations, for
instance involving sampling schemes with integration of sam-
ples internally generated, e.g., for evaluating general-knowledge
statements (Gigerenzer et al., 1991; Juslin et al., 2007; Koriat,
2012), for learning and goal-directed decisions (Hinton and
Dayan, 1996; Legenstein and Maass, 2014; Solway and Botvi-
nick, 2012), and even for probabilistic abstract reasoning (Chater
et al., 2006; Denison et al., 2013; Vul et al., 2009).
It is clear that much work remains to understand the precise
representations used by the brain and that this workwill no doubt
refine or possibly even upend our notion of confidence insofar as
it is embedded within these neural representations.
From Data to Summary: Reading out Summary
Confidence from Distributions
Cue combination (Ernst and Banks, 2002; Ma et al., 2006) and
motor control (Körding and Wolpert, 2004; Todorov, 2004;
Wolpert and Ghahramani, 2000) are examples of behaviors
whose optimization requires the use of confidence (inverse un-
certainty) and in which computations at the level of probability
distributions could elegantly account for both choice and con-
fidence implicitly. For instance, cue combination can be imple-
mented optimally using probabilistic population codes simply
by summing the activity of populations of neurons: the very
format of probabilistic neural representations could therefore
allow an automatic and optimal weighting by uncertainty (Ma
et al., 2006). However, there are behaviors in which confidence
must be expressed independently of the choice itself. One of
the simplest examples is a two-alternative choice decision.
Here, a subject is required to select one of two incompatible
binary alternatives. This ‘‘forced choice’’ by design eliminates
information about confidence that might have existed in the
original information on which the decision was based (see
Figure 2A). Yet, insofar as the original information was a prob-
abilistic neural representation, the original distributional confi-
dence information should also be available for independent
readout. For example, readout into a summary confidence
value would allow confidence to be reported verbally on a rat-
ing scale. Essentially, what needs to be done is to extract a
single number, a scalar, as a summary statistic of an entire dis-
tribution. This process, which we term ‘‘confidence readout,’’
could be considered closely analogous to the process of ex-
tracting a choice from a distribution; choice is just a summary
of a different statistic.
To see how this works in a more formal manner, in what fol-
lows, we first consider the case of binary choice and we then
consider the case of continuous choice or estimation. In Uses
of Summary Confidence and Behavioral Manifestations, we will
Figure 2. Readout of Choice and Confidence with Probabilistic Neural Codes
We compare two circuits that read out a choice (A) and a confidence level (B) from similar input information: a direction of motion encoded with a probabilistic
neural code. In both cases, the bottom graphs depict the probability distributions that can be decoded by a Bayesian observer from the population activity
illustrated above. Confidence at the level of the input is represented implicitly as the precision of the distribution.
(A) This circuit reads out a choice: it implements a categorization. It collapses the input distribution into a binary value: direction to the left or to the right.
Categorization can be implemented by an attractor network, in which two pools of neurons mutually inhibit each other, and receive excitatory input, as in Wang
(2002). The synaptic weights of these excitatory connections are fixed and reflect the feature encoded, e.g., neurons tuned to 90 connect strongly to the blue
pool of neurons. The width of the blue and red lines denotes the excitatory drive, which is a function of the fixed synaptic weight and the stimulus-dependent firing
rate. The precision of the input distribution contributes to the categorization and its robustness against noise, but this information is lost in the output: the
distributional confidence information remains ‘‘encapsulated’’ in this circuit.
(B) This circuit reads out the confidence in the orientation. This corresponds to Example 3 in the text, and it is different from the confidence in a left/right
categorization (Example 1 in the text). Here the circuit translates the input distribution into a level of activity that reflects its precision. With probabilistic population
codes, this computation can be implemented by linear summation of activities (Ma et al., 2006). Three example distributions are shown to stress that, unlike the
‘‘categorization process’’ illustrated in (A), the output here does not depend on whether the mean value is closer to the left or the right direction, it reflects only
precision.
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summary readout of confidence may be critical.
Example 1: Readout of Confidence in a Binary
Forced-Choice Decision
Consider the decision of whether a stimulus is tilted clockwise
(a+) or counter-clockwise (a) and the confidence in this deci-
sion. We first give a formal treatment of this problem and we
then provide a potential implementation.
Given the evidence received, r, (the bold font indicates a vec-
tor), there is formally a probability distribution p(ajr) that de-
scribes the posterior probability of possible angles a given r.
The optimal choice between a+ and a is to pick the option
with the highest integrated probability over all the clockwise or
counter-clockwise angles: p(a+jr) or p(ajr). Confidence in this
decision is then formally just the value of this maximal probabil-
ity. In this case, the choice and the confidence are read out
directly from p(ajr). Alternatively, one can compute an intermedi-
ate decision variable, d, which should take the form of the log
probability ratio (LPR): d = log(p(a+jr)/p(ajr)). The choice is
then determined by the sign of d (choose a+ if d > 0, otherwise
choose a) and confidence in this decision is the absolute valueof d. This formalism is standard in Bayesian decision theory and
signal detection theory. More examples and further discussion
can be found for instance in Galvin et al. (2003) and Kepecs
and Mainen (2012). This example shows (1) that a formal notion
of confidence can be quantified in a principled manner, (2) that
different, equivalent algorithms can be designed, and (3) that
choice and confidence can be read out from the same informa-
tion. In this example, the distribution p(ajr) carries confidence in-
formation in ‘‘distributional’’ form (to what extent the mass of the
distribution is more on the a+ or a side) and the highest proba-
bility among p(a+jr) and p(ajr) is a summary that provides a
scalar value to express confidence in the decision.
Example 2: Integration of Evidence in Time
One aspect that was omitted in this signal detection formalism is
that in real life, the evidence r often has a temporal dimension.
Therefore, momentary evidence must be integrated over time.
The computation of the LPR can be updated for each sample
of evidence received across time, a procedure known as the
sequential probability ratio test, to quantify, at any given
moment, what is the best option to choose and what is the
associated summary confidence level (Wald, 1945; Wald andNeuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 81
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of the drift diffusion model (DDM) and related ‘‘accumulation-to-
bound’’ models. These models have been extensively used in
mathematical psychology (Pleskac and Busemeyer, 2010; Rat-
cliff, 1988; Smith and Vickers, 1988; Vickers et al., 1985). Impor-
tantly, the decision variables posited by these accumulation
models have a candidate neural substrate exhibited in the ramp-
ing neural activity observed in parietal cortex and other brain
regions (reviewed in Gold and Shadlen, 2007). Accumulation-
to-bound models can account not only for choice and reactions
times, but also for decision confidence (Fetsch et al., 2014;
Kepecs et al., 2008; Vickers et al., 1985). The theory of probabi-
listic population codes can provide a normative algorithm for
integration of evidence over time that may be optimal for action
selection under a large range of conditions (Beck et al., 2008;
Drugowitsch and Pouget, 2012). In these models, a summary
confidence level (akin to the LRP) can be computed using linear
integration of neural activity (Beck et al., 2008; Drugowitsch and
Pouget, 2012).
Example 3: Readout of Confidence as Precision
Consider now the estimation of confidence in a quantitative var-
iable, the orientation of the stimulus. If one thinks of the probabil-
ity distribution over possible angles, high confidence in the
orientation should correspond to a distribution concentrated
onto one particular angle (see Figure 2B). This formally corre-
sponds to the precision of the distribution, its inverse variance,
which is a natural quantification of confidence in a continuous
variable (Meyniel et al., 2015; Yeung and Summerfield, 2012).
The distributional confidence information here is contained in
the full shape of the distribution, and the summary confidence
level by the precision. The precision expresses a specific ‘‘loss
function,’’ that is, how much cost one pays for being off in
one’s estimate by a given amount (Maloney and Zhang, 2010).
For a loss function based on squared error, the inverse variance
is all one needs to summarize about the distribution. However,
one can easily imagine more complex loss functions in which
precision would not be a good summary statistic. For example,
errors in one direction may be worse than in the other direction.
In this case, the precision may be an approximation, but it does
not convey all the confidence information contained in the distri-
bution. Interestingly, with a probabilistic population code and un-
der some biologically plausible assumptions, the precision of a
representation such as the orientation of a stimulus is simply pro-
portional to the sum of activities across neurons in the probabi-
listic population code (Ma et al., 2006). The readout mechanism
here is thus as simple as a linear summation (see Figure 2B).
However, the proportionality factor in this mechanism, which re-
lates to the number of neurons and the properties of their tuning
curves, raises the problem of the calibration of the summary con-
fidence, an issue to which we will return in The Rough Edges.
Relationship to Previous Models of Confidence
To sumup, we have given different names (summary confidence,
distributional confidence) to aspects of confidence that we think
are worth keeping distinct. We have described how, for simple
examples, summary confidence can be derived normatively
from the distributional confidence information conveyed by
probabilistic neural representations. We will go into more com-
plexity later, with less direct routes and deviations from opti-82 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.mality (see A Brain-Scale, Hierarchical Neural Architecture for
Confidence and also The Rough Edges). For themoment, the im-
plications of this basic conceptualization can be related to the
classic literature on confidence. We suggest that some confu-
sion in the field of confidence studies is due to the conflation
of distributional and summary forms.
We propose that in decision-making, choice and confidence
can be read out from the same neural representation (Kepecs
and Mainen, 2012; Kepecs et al., 2008). This view resembles
the ‘‘shared encoding’’ hypothesis reported by Grimaldi et al.
(2015) or ‘‘first-order model’’ (Timmermans et al., 2012) in which
the same stream of information accounts for choice and confi-
dence. However, these models are usually thought to entail
that the same circuitry underpins choice and confidence (Gri-
maldi et al., 2015). We suggest the opposite: the mechanisms
that read out a choice and a summary confidence from the
same representation must be partly different, simply because
they result in different things. Such ‘‘parallel processing’’ of
choice and confidence is the landmark of ‘‘dual route models’’
(Timmermans et al., 2012), but our framework rejects a pure
parallelism by assuming a common initial representation. Our
view could therefore seem closer to ‘‘hierarchical models’’
(Fleming and Dolan, 2012; Fleming et al., 2012; Timmermans
et al., 2012). However, such models make a distinction between
a first-order level (choice) and a second-order level (confidence)
processing. This distinction is a landmark in the metacognition
literature. In our view, there is no need for such a terminology:
readout of choice and confidence are simply different without
one being subordinate to the other.
We can see one case in which such a distinction of ‘‘orders’’
makes sense in our view. It is the distinction made between
type 1 and type 2 confidence, reviewed in Galvin et al. (2003).
We used the example of confidence in whether a stimulus was
oriented clockwise or counter-clockwise. This would corre-
spond to first-order (type 1) confidence. This is different from se-
lecting one option, and then evaluating the confidence that this
selection is correct, which would correspond to second-order
(type 2) confidence. Type 2 confidence and the choice are not
necessarily read out from the same representation. For instance,
additional information about the orientation of the stimulus may
be processed between the choice and the type 2 confidence
report. Such a two-stage processing has been proposed (Ple-
skac and Busemeyer, 2010; Resulaj et al., 2009).
Uses of Summary Confidence and Behavioral
Manifestations
We have so far discussed how confidence may be represented
and how it may be read out from a distribution into a single sum-
mary value. We have already seen how distributional confidence
(uncertainty) can be used without summary to optimize sensori-
motor behaviors. Now we turn to look at some of the uses of
summary confidence. We consider first the use of summary
confidence in decision-making and then two other examples,
learning and sampling.
Decision Optimization
A key example of the use of summary confidence is when sub-
jects report it on a quantitative scale to communicate the reli-
ability of an entity (a choice, a memory, an opinion) to others.
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must be reduced to a single value, a scalar. Explicit verbal ratings
were the initial thread of research in psychology (Peirce and Jas-
trow, 1884) and they continue to be a focal point for psycholog-
ical studies (for reviews, see Galvin et al., 2003; Pleskac and
Busemeyer, 2010). Reports of confidence can be useful in col-
lective decision (Bahrami et al., 2010; Bang et al., 2014). Indeed,
an optimal collective decision can benefit from the uncertainty
weighting of individual decisions and this is an important area
for research (Pérez-Escudero and de Polavieja, 2011). For purely
individual decisions, expressing summary confidence with a
verbal report seems irrelevant, but experimental designs can
translate this information into specific behaviors, such as post-
decision wagers. Thus, rather than reporting confidence on a
scale from high to low, subjects must decide an amount of
money (again, a scalar) to invest in a decision with a degree of
uncertainty (Persaud et al., 2007). Using a similar logic, animals
can also be induced to ‘‘wager’’ on the outcomes of their deci-
sions (reviewed by Kepecs and Mainen, 2012; Smith et al.,
2003). Insofar as humans and animals optimize the payoffs of
risky decisions, this will induce the expression of confidence in
the wagers. This area is an active and important area of conver-
gence of human and animal studies. Let us consider in more
detail one of several paradigms, the so-called ‘‘opt-out’’ task.
Considering the example of orientation discrimination, we saw
above that a summary confidence level in the orientation
discrimination could be derived as the probability that the stim-
ulus has one orientation rather than the other (a+ or a). Suppose
that the participant is given the opportunity to either provide an
answer (a+ or a) and gain a large reward if it is correct and no
reward in case of error, or to opt-out (decline to provide an
answer) and get a small reward for sure. This is a classic
value-based decision-making problem (Glimcher et al., 2009;
Rangel et al., 2008). Maximizing the expected reward in this
problem requires multiplying the reward magnitude and the
probability of reward (pR). If the subject opts out, pR = 1. Other-
wise, the subject’s estimate of pR should correspond to the sum-
mary confidence in the orientation discrimination. Therefore,
having observed a decision to opt-out or not, one can infer
whether the subject’s summary confidence was above or below
the ratio of the value of the sure reward to the risky one (Hamp-
ton, 2001; Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Middlebrooks and Sommer,
2012).
The opt-out example illustrates how choices based on uncer-
tain information can serve to measure a subject’s summary con-
fidence. Insofar as people and animals seek to optimize their
gains, these choices require that summary confidence is derived
as accurately as possible from the subject’s internal representa-
tion of that information. That is, optimal wagering decisions
require optimal readout of summary confidence from distribu-
tional confidence, provided that such information is available
to inform the outcome. Importantly, because wagering-based
measures do not require verbal report, they are well-suited to
measuring summary confidence in non-human animals. Also
importantly, the opt-out task is only one of a larger class of
wagering-like paradigms that can take advantage of ecologically
relevant scenarios. In waiting-time paradigms, reward is deliv-
ered for correct decisions, but only after a delay and the subjecthas the opportunity to initiate a new trial instead of waiting. Wait-
ing after an error thus has an opportunity cost, so willingness to
wait should, normatively, depend on the estimated accuracy
(Kepecs et al., 2008; Lak et al., 2014). For more examples and
details on paradigms, see Kepecs and Mainen (2012) and for a
review of comparative studies, see Smith et al. (2003). It is impor-
tant to note that a subject’s gain/loss function will also in general
dependent on other factors and biases, such as loss or risk aver-
sion, which will interact with it in ways that can make confidence
difficult to disentangle from other factors (Fleming and Dolan,
2010).
The above description suggests that behaviors such as opt-
out, wagering, waiting-time, etc. are indirect measures of the
subject’s summary confidence. In our framework, the relevant
distributional confidence information could be read out into a
summary confidence level that could then be translated into a
specific report. However, we also note that the existence of a
summary confidence level as an intermediate variable is not
necessary as such: the readout of the distributional confidence
information could be directly mapped onto a specific behavior.
Optimization of Learning
The role of confidence in learning is often overlooked in the con-
fidence literature, but it is well established in computational
learning theory, where it is typically referred to as ‘‘uncertainty.’’
Decisions build on prior knowledge and learning. Confidence (or
uncertainty) plays a key role in acquiring knowledge and updat-
ing it according to new data. The Bayesian view provides a
normative account for the updating process, indicating how,
based on uncertainty, prior knowledge and new observations
should be combined during learning. Optimal algorithms, such
as the Kalman filter, developed by engineers in the 1960s form
a foundation for modern accounts of learning in cognitive sci-
ence and neuroscience (Bach and Dolan, 2012; Bland and
Schaefer, 2012; Daunizeau et al., 2010; Mathys et al., 2011; Nas-
sar et al., 2010; Payzan-LeNestour and Bossaerts, 2011; Pre-
uschoff and Bossaerts, 2007). Essentially, the more confident
we are in a new observation (e.g., because the stimulus is clear),
the more this observation should impact our prior knowledge.
Conversely, the more confident we are in our prior knowledge
(e.g., because of extensive and successful prior experience)
the less a new discrepant observation should affect it.
Therefore, in learning, confidence should play the role of a
weighting factor to balance incoming and prior information in up-
dating one’s current knowledge. There is evidence that human
subjects indeed adapt their learning rates according to both prior
knowledge (Behrens et al., 2007; McGuire et al., 2014; Nassar
et al., 2010; Payzan-LeNestour and Bossaerts, 2011; Yu and
Dayan, 2005) and the likelihood of observed data (O’Reilly
et al., 2013). One can envision a role for either distributional con-
fidence representations or summary (scalar) representations in
this process. On the one hand, if priors and evidence are both
represented in properly formed probability distributions (Berkes
et al., 2011), then confidence could be assessed in the same
manner as it would be for the representation of a sensory poste-
rior (Bejjanki et al., 2011). On the other hand, confidence
about current or prior knowledge could also be summarized
and represented as a single value that could be used to scale
other probability distributions or set a learning rate. The neuralNeuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 83
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major ascending neuromodulatory systems (dopamine, seroto-
nin, noradrenaline, and acetylcholine) as they may convey confi-
dence information (Doya, 2002; Yu and Dayan, 2005). Given the
small number of neurons and their widespread projection pat-
terns, these systems are more likely to represent scalar values
(summary confidence) than distributions (distributional confi-
dence). This view implies that a readout of the summary confi-
dence broadcast by these systems might occur either in the
related brainstem nuclei or in their input structures.
The role of confidence in learning raises interesting chal-
lenges. How to estimate (algorithmically and mechanistically)
confidence in a new observation that suffers from sensory uncer-
tainty is essentially the same problem as extracting confidence
for a decision. However, estimating confidence from prior knowl-
edge, so that it can be used to adjust learning rates, has received
less attention. Computationally, one way to estimate the error
rate of a model is by computing deviations between predictions
derived from this knowledge and actual observations (Courville
et al., 2004; Preuschoff and Bossaerts, 2007). Such a process
is in some sense agnostic of the form in which this prior knowl-
edge is represented before being turned into an error signal. In
fact, confidence need not be represented explicitly in any
manner other than the error signals themselves.
It has also been proposed that confidence may contribute not
only to the optimization of learning algorithms, but also to the se-
lection between different, competing algorithms, such asmodel-
based and model-free learning strategies (Daw et al., 2005).
Optimization of Information-Seeking
Decisions require not only selecting between alternatives but
also require knowing when to stop weighing evidence and to
act on what is known. When we integrate information sequen-
tially, more samples of information can enablemore accurate de-
cisions but at the cost of longer deliberation. A real-world
example of this is a student deciding how long to study for an
exam. Themore information is acquired, the higher the likelihood
of giving correct answers in the test and, hence, the greater the
probability of the ensuring benefits of good grades. But studying
is taxing and has the opportunity cost of not engaging in more
interesting activities like socializing. To optimize this problem
the student should take advantage of confidence in knowing
the information being studied.
We have seen in From Data to Summary: Reading out Sum-
mary Confidence from Distributions how confidence can be ob-
tained as an output from decision variables in sequential sam-
pling models. We can also consider in the same models that
confidence could also be critical as an input to set the level of
the stopping bound. Formally, the samples determine the likeli-
hood of each alternative, and the ratio of likelihoods (or its log,
as the LPR above) quantifies the expressed confidence level
that one alternative is better than the other. In the 1940s, Wald
showed that, in decisions based on sequential samples, one
can compute the LPR iteratively and commit to a choice when
the test first meets a pre-defined confidence criterion (Wald,
1945). Most importantly, Wald showed that this strategy mini-
mizes the number of samples integrated, while controlling the
expected error rate (Wald and Wolfowitz, 1948). This decision
rule is the principle of drift-diffusion models, among which84 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.several variants have been proposed (Kiani et al., 2014; Pleskac
and Busemeyer, 2010; Ratcliff, 1988; Smith and Vickers, 1988;
Vickers et al., 1985). Little is known, in terms of neural mecha-
nisms, about what determines the bound or stopping rule in a
decision process. Scaling a threshold parameter could be imple-
mented by an appropriate confidence summary signal and this
too might be conveyed by a neuromodulatory signal.
A Brain-Scale, Hierarchical Neural Architecture for
Confidence
Feed-Forward Processing in Brain-Scale Circuits
Our basic view posits that widespread confidence information
conveyed by probabilistic neural representations can sometimes
be used directly in its implicit distributional form andmay in other
cases be read out into a summary (scalar) confidence signal.
Readout is probably most evident when subjects are interro-
gated verbally, but it might underlie other behavioral expressions
of confidence. The examples of setting learning rates or setting a
decision threshold, which might be carried out by scalar signals
carried by neuromodulators, illustrate an intrinsic advantage fa-
voring the readout of confidence into a scalar confidence level: a
scalar signal requires much less wiring to transmit than a full dis-
tribution andmay facilitate flexible routing of this kind of informa-
tion. Thus, although a summary statistic must necessarily be an
approximation of a full probability distribution, representing con-
fidence using a scalar could offer benefits of efficiency that
outweigh that liability, particularly for functions involving more
global computations.
This two-part model implies a kind of ‘‘bottom up’’ processing
of information—from implicit distributional forms of confidence
to simpler and more explicit, summarized forms. For the case
of decision-making this entails two predictions. First, manipu-
lating the source of the original probabilistic representation
should affect the readouts of both choices and confidence
levels. Stronger levels of evidence lead, as expected, to higher
levels of confidence in humans, monkeys, and rodents across
a variety of tasks, such as visual or olfactory discrimination (Bar-
thelmé and Mamassian, 2010, 2009; Kepecs et al., 2008; Kiani
and Shadlen, 2009; King and Dehaene, 2014; Peirce and Jas-
trow, 1884). Further evidence is provided by manipulation of
neural representations in early sensory areas. Application of
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to the visual cortex while
human participants performed a visual task induced changes in
both choice and confidence (Rahnev et al., 2012). In monkeys,
small currents injected in motion-sensitive regions MT/MST dur-
ing a motion discrimination task mimicked an increment in
perceived motion, which shifted both choices and confidence
levels; higher levels of currents mimicked an increment in
perceptual noise that degraded the accuracy of both choices
and confidence (Fetsch et al., 2014).
Readout from a neural representation can be considered akin
to a routing process; it may serve to ‘‘untangle’’ different kinds
of information that are implicit in a neural representation. For
example, the ventral visual stream is thought to progressively un-
tangle different features of a visual scene through non-linear de-
coding (DiCarlo andCox, 2007). Once choice and confidence are
read out from a neural representation, different downstream
areas may process them independently. Therefore, the second
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downstream of the source representation might selectively and
independently affect the readout of summary confidence or
choice. In particular, it should sometimes be possible to manip-
ulate summary confidence while leaving the decision accuracy
unaffected.
Indeed, it has been shown that inactivation of the pulvinar nu-
cleus of the thalamus, in a visual opt-out task in monkeys (Ko-
mura et al., 2013), and inactivation of the orbito-frontal cortex
(OFC), in an olfactory waiting-time task in rats (Kepecs et al.,
2008; Lak et al., 2014), selectively disrupted confidence while
leaving decision accuracy unaffected. In these studies, it was
further shown that activity in these regions correlated with the
expressed confidence. However, it is not clear whether inactiva-
tion disrupted an area specifically concerned with the represen-
tation of summary confidence, or whether instead it disrupted
the regulation of a behavior (opt-out, waiting-time) more closely
associated with the expression of that confidence. Tests in
which multiple reporting modalities can be queried would be
helpful to tease apart these alternatives.
Specialized Brain-Scale Circuits for Confidence?
According to our basic view, we would expect that many brain
circuits may ultimately prove to be implicated in confidence,
but in different ways. Consider the case of a perceptual task
that includes a waiting-time component (e.g., Lak et al.
(2014); see Uses of Summary Confidence and Behavioral
Manifestations). Sensory regions relevant for the decision are
strongly involved in computing/representing the distributional
confidence information. Additional circuits may perform the
readout to extract the summary confidence level, such as
perhaps the OFC. And this summary confidence level could
then be used to regulate the behavior (how long to wait), which
likely involves frontal control and motor circuits (e.g., Murakami
et al., 2014). Taken together, this covers a large swath of
cortical circuitry.
A more specific and challenging question is whether there are
specific regions or circuits critical for confidence readout or
summary confidence representation. It has been proposed that
the anterior prefrontal cortex (corresponding to the OFC, the
fronto-polar cortex, and dorso-medial PFC) could be involved
in this process (Barttfeld et al., 2013; Fleming et al., 2010; Ke-
pecs et al., 2008; Lak et al., 2014; Middlebrooks and Sommer,
2012; Yokoyama et al., 2010). De Martino and colleagues (De
Martino et al., 2013) showed that in value-based decisions in
humans, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) conveys
mixed information about value and confidence, hence providing
an implicit code of confidence. Instead, the rostrolateral prefron-
tal cortex (rlPFC) correlated with confidence (independently of
value) and hence may be, in this task, a more likely candidate
to encode the result of the readout process. Moreover, the
strength of the connectivity between vmPFC and rlPFC pre-
dicted the precision of confidence judgments of individuals in
this task. This is a macroscopic marker that suggests that vari-
ability in the readout (here indexed by the strength between
these two cortical regions) can account for inter-individual differ-
ences in the estimation of confidence.
The quest for a general brain circuit performing confidence
readout is complicated in practice because it is difficult to disen-tangle between circuits that perform a readout of a summary
confidence level from the circuits serving as input for the readout
or those that use this readout. We point to two brain circuits that
may suffer this issue. The first is the anterior prefrontal cortex re-
ported above. This region is often associated with confidence in
tasks that involve evaluating one’s own performance and the
detection of errors (Yeung and Summerfield, 2012), which is
likely to be related to circuits involved in executive and cognitive
control (Fernandez-Duque et al., 2000). The second is the ventral
striatum, which has been related to confidence (d’Acremont
et al., 2013; Hebart et al., 2014; O’Reilly et al., 2013; Preuschoff
et al., 2006; Vilares et al., 2012), butmostly insofar as predicting a
reward or success is involved. A more nuanced view would sug-
gest that different circuits (which remain to be pinned down) will
be flexibly involved depending on the way the confidence infor-
mation is routed based on behavioral needs.
Interestingly, the readout of confidence can be selectively
impaired in specific domains. Fleming and colleagues reported
such a case: patients with brain lesions in the anterior PFC had
preserved performance in the memory and perceptual domains
and degraded confidence judgments specifically in the percep-
tual domain (Fleming et al., 2014). The fact that choice perfor-
mance was preserved rules out the possibility that perception
or memory, as a whole, were impaired, and points to the readout
of confidence itself. This example suggests that one region alone
does not suffice to read out confidence: at a minimum, it should
involve a circuitry to collect specific inputs from different cogni-
tive domains.
Beyond Forward Linear Processing of Information
The view adopted so far might suggest feed-forward linear pro-
cessing of information. However, considering both the highly
recurrent nature of brain circuitry and the fact that sources of un-
certainty are often interdependent, we suspect that the real case
will be a hierarchical and loopy architecture, with branches and
feedback (Bach and Dolan, 2012). As a first example, following
the example discussed in From Data to Summary: Reading out
Summary Confidence from Distributions (Galvin et al., 2003),
consider the distinction between confidence in an orientation
discrimination (type 1) and the confidence in the answer made
about this orientation discrimination (type 2). The contrast be-
tween two experimental studies illustrates the need, for post-
decision (type 2) confidence, to represent both the sensory infor-
mation and the answer made. The injection of noise by applying
TMS to the visual cortex could be expected to perturb the con-
fidence report in a visual task, as was shown in Rahnev et al.
(2012). But curiously, TMS applied to the dorsal premotor cortex
also disrupted the accuracy of the confidence report while leav-
ing the accuracy of the decision unaffected (Fleming et al., 2015).
This pair of experiments could be interpreted as implying that
premotor TMS introduced uncertainty about which motor re-
sponses was made, and thus about whether the visual decision
was accurate.
A second example relates to learning. Generally, each time
new evidence is received, a prior and a current likelihood must
be combined to infer a posterior. This implies a recursive pro-
cess: at each iteration, the prior must be adjusted based on
the observed accuracy of the prediction that arose from this
prior and the momentary evidence (likelihood). The need for aNeuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 85
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processing view.
Encapsulation of Confidence
Not all the probabilistic representations will undergo summariza-
tion and broadcasting. Distributional confidence information
could be described as ‘‘encapsulated’’ when it is implicitly
conveyed by a probabilistic neural representation but remains
confined within a particular, specialized circuit. In computer pro-
gramming, from where the term is drawn, encapsulation is a way
of deliberately shielding information; here, we consider only that
it is de facto not accessible. There are several non-mutually
exclusive reasons why distributional confidence information
may not be accessible outside from a given circuit or brain re-
gion. Themost trivial is that that area is poorly connected to other
regions. Another reason is that the circuit is connected, but the
connections are not amenable to a readout of confidence. A sim-
ple example of this is a circuit that performs response selection
(see Figure 2; Soltani and Wang, 2010; Wang, 2002). This circuit
may accurately compute the probability that a stimulus is pre-
sent but it may collapse this probability to yield a binary variable
signaling the presence or absence of the stimulus. In an action
selection circuit such as this one, details about the computation,
including the confidence information, remain inaccessible.
Dense connections of the sort that might be necessary for
readout are typically found within specialized, well-tuned sys-
tems for perception, motor control or learning. But connections
between systems are usually sparser, a connectivity profile
known as ‘‘rich-club’’ (van den Heuvel et al., 2012; Zylberberg
et al., 2010). This could suggest that not all sub-systems can
read out confidence from all the other sub-systems, and that
only a limited fraction of the distributional confidence information
is read out and routed between systems. Or in other words, that
confidence information may usually remain encapsulated.
A Global Workspace for Confidence?
When confidence is not encapsulated but read out, the summary
confidence level can be used for multiple purposes (see Uses of
Summary Confidence and Behavioral Manifestations) across a
variety of cognitive tasks. This suggests a flexible routing of sum-
mary confidence levels between different domains in a ‘‘global
neuronal workspace,’’ a set of interconnected high-level cortical
regions that underpins the flexible sharing and routing of infor-
mation globally in the brain (for a review, see Dehaene et al.,
2014).
A hallmark of global workspace processing is that only a
limited amount of information is selected and amplified (De-
haene, 2014; Sergent et al., 2005; Zylberberg et al., 2010). Due
to its limited capacity, global workspace processing may, unlike
sensorimotor transformations, be incompatible with full pro-
babilistic representation and inference. Global processing may
nevertheless be able to access summary forms of confidence,
as, for instance, the level of accumulated evidence can be moni-
tored (Dehaene et al., 2014).
Limited capacity may be the cost of the flexibility afforded by
processing in a global workspace. Some experimental designs
make such a flexible routing particularly salient. One example
is when confidence in performance must be used not only within
a particular task type, but also compared between two different
task types (de Gardelle and Mamassian, 2014). Use of simpler86 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.scalar confidence representations could allow the flexibility
necessary to perform this comparison even for arbitrary pairs
of tasks. Another example is the comparison of confidence
from two brain systems (e.g., model-based and model-free
learning systems) to decide which strategy to follow (Daw
et al., 2005). In principle, this could also be performed by
comparing summary confidence levels without the use of full
distributional information.
Shea and colleagues (Shea et al., 2014) have argued that
confidence reports made by non-human animals (see Uses of
Summary Confidence and Behavioral Manifestations) do not
necessarily require a global workspace. This is an important
point, also valid in humans. Cognitive processes are full of exam-
ples in which some information is available to a certain extent
and impacts behavior, but without being reportable (Atas et al.,
2014; Rose et al., 2005; Schlaghecken et al., 2000; van Zuijen
et al., 2006). A relevant example for confidence may be sublim-
inal reinforcement learning: subjects can become confident in
the reward delivery following specific cues, which is demon-
strated by their choices and the neural prediction errors
observed in case of violations, but they remain unaware of it
(Pessiglione et al., 2008).
The Rough Edges
The aim of this section is to help to solve a conundrum. If neural
circuits function inherently probabilistically, why is confidence
sometimes estimated in a way that is inconsistent with probabil-
ity theory, reflecting biases and reliable inconsistencies (Kahne-
man, 2013)? Many behaviors are close to optimal (Ma and
Jazayeri, 2014; Maloney and Zhang, 2010; Pouget et al., 2013)
but decades of experimentation in ‘‘real-life’’ decision problems
have also shown that humans commonly assign confidence sub-
optimally, relying on sub-samples of the data, focusing on
tokens (representative exemplars), ignoring the variance of the
distribution, and over-weighting evidence confirming commit-
ments and choices that have been made (Griffin and Tversky,
1992; Kahneman, 2013).
One simple possibility is that errors of confidence are found in
real life because real life involves complex high dimensional
problems for which there may not be accurate distributional rep-
resentations available in neural circuits. However, distortions of
confidence can be observed even in simple decision tasks (Gra-
ziano and Sigman, 2009; Jarvstad et al., 2013; Rahnev et al.,
2012; Wu et al., 2009; Zylberberg et al., 2012, 2014). Distortions
of confidence were mentioned already in the seminal work of
Peirce and Jastrow on small differences in tactile perception
(Peirce and Jastrow, 1884). Here we argue that suboptimality
arises from approximations inherent in probabilistic representa-
tions, particularly in the readout of summary confidence from
probabilistic representations, and that this framework can
potentially help to explain the specific deviations from optimality
that arise as a consequence of specific features of these approx-
imations.
Calibration
Formally, a confidence level in X is calibrated if it reflects directly
a normative quantity, such as the probability of X (Baranski and
Petrusic, 1994; Kepecs and Mainen, 2012; Koriat, 2012). Uncal-
ibrated, or miscalibrated estimates are pervasive issues for
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sions to describe identical probabilistic situations (Wallsten
and Budescu, 1995). Verbal expression of probabilities is highly
idiosyncratic, but characterizing individual idiosyncrasies helps
to standardize linguistic reports of uncertainty between individ-
uals (Karelitz and Budescu, 2004). This study showed that
probabilities are represented precisely but translate differently
between individuals’ verbal readouts. The expression of confi-
dence may also differ culturally: some groups of people express
continuous notions of probabilities whereas other groups
are more categorical (all-or-none) (Phillips and Wright, 1977).
Well-calibrated confidence levels have obvious advantages,
e.g., for sharing confidence between individuals (Bang et al.,
2014). Calibrated summary confidence (be they linguistic or
not) is also useful at the individual level, for instance to use con-
fidence across different tasks (de Gardelle and Mamassian,
2014), or more generally, whenever confidence is used to adjust
a behavior.
The readout of summary confidence in neural systems is sub-
jected to calibration issues. In From Data to Summary: Reading
out Summary Confidence from Distributions, we described a
mechanism to compute the precision of a neural representation
(the orientation of a stimulus), that relied on a scaling factor (Ma
et al., 2006). The possibility that precision estimates from two
different representations may be scaled differently impedes a
direct comparison. Normalization would provide an absolute
reference, but may not be trivial to compute. To establish a map-
ping between a scalar quantity and a norm (a probability, a preci-
sion), scaling factors and transfer functions may have to be
adjusted. As with other mappings, this process may require
learning and feedback, so that with substantial training distor-
tions of confidence may be reduced to calibrate the readout pro-
cess. Indeed, at least at the behavioral level, there is evidence
that a better calibration of confidence reports can be achieved
by relying on appropriate feedback (Baranski and Petrusic,
1994; Hart et al., 2015). At the neuronal level, the implementation
of such a tuning of the readout is entirely an open issue and,
similarly, the class of problems for which a precise readout of
summary confidence levels can be achieved remains largely un-
known. However, the fact that readout parameters ought to be
learned indicates that a neural circuit for confidence cannot rely
on purely feed-forward processing, but most likely also involves
feedback mechanisms to calibrate and adjust the parameters.
Heuristics Revisited
Our framework posits that confidence and choice result from
different readouts of the same neuronal circuits. Again this needs
to be reconciled with a very different view that emerges from the
field of behavioral economics, which has proposed that confi-
dence estimates rely on short-cuts and ‘‘heuristics’’ (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1982; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). The term
‘‘heuristic’’ is often quite vague and may refer to very different
computations. Some are simply approximations. Below we
discuss how approximations in the readout process may result,
in our framework, in expressions of confidence that are typically
observed in human subjects. A second type of heuristic involves
relying on observables beyond the relevant distributional neural
representations of confidence. For instance in a visual task, one
could index confidence by statistics of the input that reflect thedifficulty of the decision, e.g., whether the stimulus is crowded,
masked, etc., rather than on the more complex neural represen-
tation on which the choice is based.
It is possible to quantify the ‘‘richness’’ and sophistication of
the information from which confidence is read out, by testing
the extent to which a subset of the available information can ac-
count for the observed confidence. In the previous example,
confidence about performance reported by subjects matched
their actual performance more closely than what could be pre-
dicted from particular visual properties of the stimuli (crowded-
ness and masking), suggesting that subjects based their choice
and confidence report on more complex information (Barthelmé
and Mamassian, 2010). Similarly, in a probabilistic learning task,
subjective confidence in the learned estimates followed the
optimal Bayesian confidence levels in a tighter parallel than a
whole list of ‘‘cues’’ taken together, suggesting that the repre-
sentation from which confidence is read out was particularly
rich and most likely probabilistic (Meyniel et al., 2015).
The two examples above (Barthelmé and Mamassian, 2010;
Meyniel et al., 2015) are cases stressing that choice readout
and confidence readout can be based on the same information.
But it is a corollary of our thesis that the confidence readout
may be based only on a subset of the information, compared to
the choice readout. This is one restatement of the notion of ‘‘heu-
ristic’’ in terms of the model that we propose in which different
levels of description of probability distributions are assumed.
Our framework also posits the existence of ‘‘encapsulated’’ con-
fidence information: the relevant source of information from
which to derive a summary confidencemay simply not be acces-
sible. In addition, we introduced the idea that readout mecha-
nisms of confidence could ‘‘learn’’ how to produce reasonable
summary confidence levels. It is conceivable in our framework
that learned readout strategies have converged to very indirect
correlates of confidence levels, especially when the distributional
confidence is encapsulated. This is for instance what people do
when they infer the subjective confidence of another person, sim-
ply through the observation of their actions (Patel et al., 2012).
Another way of reinterpreting ‘‘heuristic’’ with our probabilistic
framework is to consider the case in which the correct computa-
tion is applied in the wrong situation. One example is provided by
the drift diffusion model (DDM). In the DDM, under some as-
sumptions, the time to reach a pre-defined threshold of accumu-
lated evidence is a valid summary statistic for confidence in the
decision (Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Kiani et al., 2014). One of the
assumptions is that the process that delivers the noisy evidence
is stable across time. Reading out confidence from decision
time, which is often called a heuristic, is therefore a valid readout
mechanism, but only in some circumstances; using it when the
input signal is not stable therefore produces sub-optimal sum-
mary confidence levels (Kiani et al., 2014).
Another example of correct computation in thewrong situation
is the confirmatory bias or ‘‘halo’’ effect, according to which we
seek and favor evidence that confirms our current hypothesis.
This effect is seen even in very simple perceptual decisions
such as luminance or motion judgments (Zylberberg et al.,
2012). A Bayesian analysis can capture the asymmetry that evi-
dence favoring the current hypothesis may be weighted differ-
ently than evidence against. In Bayesian terms, the confirmatoryNeuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 87
Figure 3. Deviation from optimality in the framework of signal
detection theory
(A) The green curve illustrates how to account for decision (here, orientation
discrimination) and confidence with signal detection theory. Sensory evidence
is represented internally by a variable, x. The true orientation of the stimulus, m,
is translated into the internal variable x with some noise, as denoted by the
green distribution. Say that the subject has to categorize this orientation with
respect to 0. Despite the fact that true orientation (m) is positive, it is not unlikely
that a negative value is erroneously sampled, since a large portion of the green
distribution crosses the boundary. The probability of error would be reduced
for higher values of the true orientation (m more positive). As a consequence,
the sign of smaller values of x are more likely to differ from the actual true sign
of m because of perceptual noise: erroneous categorization is more likely. The
width of the low confidence zone should depend on the estimated noise in the
perceptual system (width of the green distribution).
(B) The curves show the probability for a given true orientation m to be asso-
ciated with sensory evidence (denoted x in panel A) in the high confidence
zone. The blue curve illustrates the counter-intuitive result that when the signal
is low (m 0) and the confidence zone remains the same, then an increase in
perceptual noise should lead to over-confidence.
Box 2. Future Directions
d Neural codes for probabilities and uncertainty. At least two
families of probabilistic neural representations were pro-
posed: probabilistic neural codes and sampling-based co-
des. Do different codes correspond to different uses of
confidence?
d Mechanism for readout. We described confidence as an
emergent property of computations based on probabilistic
neural representations. Confidence can however also be
read out and summarized: what are the neural mecha-
nisms that single out and extract the confidence informa-
tion from probabilistic neural representations?
d How many systems? Distinct neural correlates were re-
ported for distinct kinds of uncertainty. However these cor-
relates can correspond to the readout of confidence levels
as such or to computations that are entailed by this confi-
dence level (decide to wait, collect more information, etc.).
It is still unclear which systems truly read out summary
confidence.
d The role of global processing. Confidence is sometimes re-
ported explicitly, suggesting that it is processed in a global
workspace. To what extent can confidence be read out
without entering a global workspace and how may global
processes interact with local readout processes?
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probability estimated so far. Biasing momentary samples by
prior expectations facilitates perceptual decisions and is rele-
vant when the input signals are structured in time, as they often
are (Summerfield and de Lange, 2014). However, when one
should learn equally and independently from each samples,
then it is sub-optimal to bias momentary evidence in this way.
Approximated Probabilistic Computations
Deviations from optimality observed in behavior are often used as
reasons to reject a probabilistic view of brain functioning. The
examples above show that decision making, even in simple
perceptual problems, can follow a probabilistic logic and still be
suboptimal because of specific approximations (Griffiths et al.,
2012; Ma and Jazayeri, 2014). Acerbi and colleagues showed in
a sensory motor task that prior distributions with different shapes
(Gaussian, non-symmetric, bimodal, etc.) could be usedwith only
minor errors that, crucially, were independent from the shape of
the distribution (Acerbi et al., 2014). Their results suggest that de-
viations from optimality observed in the behavior are not due to a
fundamental inability to represent and combine probability distri-
butions, butmight instead bedue to randomnoise in this process.
A similar argument is made by Costello and Watts, who suggest
that biases in probability judgment may arise from a fundamental
adherence to probability theory, but corrupted by random ap-
proximations (Costello and Watts, 2014).
An algorithmic level of description also reveals that the
Bayesian framework accounts for both optimal behaviors and
systematic deviations. For instance, processing a sequence of
inputs can be modeled algorithmically by particle filters, a popu-
lar approximation of Bayesian inference. These models have the88 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.advantage of relying only on a few free parameters (e.g., the num-
ber of samples used, the stability of samples between iterations,
etc.), which delineate some regimes that are close to optimal
inference, and other regimes that produce common biases
such as primacy and recency effects (Abbott andGriffiths, 2011).
One last example shows that approximations in uncertainty
(variance) estimates can be amplified in confidence levels. For
instance, in signal detection theory, confidence relates formally
to the ratio between themean evidence (‘‘signal’’) and its reliability
(‘‘variance’’). Note that since the variance term is in the denomina-
tor, because of scaling effects, slight errors in the estimation of the
variance may lead to large mis-estimations of confidence. A full
Bayesian analysis confirms this intuition and experiments show
that slight mis-perception in the variance of an internal represen-
tation may lead to marked overconfidence in trials with unreliable
evidence (Zylberberg et al., 2014; see Figure 3).
In summary, what we perceive as heuristics in confidence
judgmentsmay result fromdifferent sources: (1) genuine approx-
imations of a read-out process, including issues of calibration; (2)
applying stereotyped read-out procedures that make certain as-
sumptions that do not hold in a given context, a form of approx-
imation referred as relaxation; and (3) using variables that covary
with the relevant neural confidence information in cases in which
this information is not accessible for explicit reports.
Challenges
We acknowledge that there are substantial experimental chal-
lenges for the identification of distributional and summary confi-
dence signals in the brain (see Box 2 ‘‘Future directions’’).
Indeed, decoding distributional confidence information will ulti-
mately require one to understand the nature of the relevant prob-
abilistic neural representations. This may be particularly difficult
Neuron
Perspectivefor representations that are akin to probability distributions,
involving numerous neurons. Simultaneous recordings of the
relevant neurons, together with ‘‘labels’’ of what each neuron en-
codes are necessary, which is difficult if these relevant neurons
are intermingled and scattered in a large population, or if the in-
formation they encode is not a simple property amenable to se-
lective manipulation.
It may seem comparatively easy to find neurons whose activity
co-varies with summary confidence. However, as we have re-
viewed, such co-variation is not strong evidence that this activity
results directly from a readout of confidence, since it could also
reflect processes that correlate with confidence levels, either
being downstream as part of the reporting mechanism or in
confidence-regulated functions such as learning, information
seeking, etc. We saw in A Brain-Scale, Hierarchical Neural Archi-
tecture for Confidence that it is difficult to tease apart the struc-
tures that are involved in reading out confidence from the struc-
tures that use summary confidence levels.
Another important challenge for our theory is that it is inspired
by what we know about probabilistic neural codes, which is still
largely restricted to sensory areas. We make the proposal that
the separation between distributional confidence information
and its readout into a summary could be general. However, the
way it works will depend on the specifics of neural codes, which
could differ in non-sensory domains. Interestingly, a number of
classic models of cognitive and neural processing can be recast
in the framework of probabilistic coding (Solway and Botvinick,
2012), providing candidate hypotheses for neural representa-
tions in these domains.Conclusions
In this perspective we stressed that defining confidence as
Bayesian probability clarifies the notion of confidence and invites
one to consider a wide range of functions and implementations
for confidence-based computations in the brain. In that sense,
the concept of confidence may be pervasively relevant in neuro-
science and broader than previously envisaged. We proposed a
distinction between two fundamental levels: distributional confi-
dence information, conveyed by probabilistic neural representa-
tions, and the summary confidence values that can be read out
from these distributions.Wehighlighted different functional char-
acteristics and kinds of confidence-based computations and
caution that the study of confidence should therefore not be
separated from its functions and the levels at which it operates.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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Barthelmé, S., and Mamassian, P. (2010). Flexible mechanisms underlie the
evaluation of visual confidence. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 107, 20834–20839.
Barttfeld, P., Wicker, B., McAleer, P., Belin, P., Cojan, Y., Graziano, M., Lei-
guarda, R., and Sigman, M. (2013). Distinct patterns of functional brain con-
nectivity correlate with objective performance and subjective beliefs. Proc.
Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 110, 11577–11582.
Beck, J.M., Ma, W.J., Kiani, R., Hanks, T., Churchland, A.K., Roitman, J.,
Shadlen, M.N., Latham, P.E., and Pouget, A. (2008). Probabilistic population
codes for Bayesian decision making. Neuron 60, 1142–1152.
Behrens, T.E.J., Woolrich, M.W., Walton, M.E., and Rushworth, M.F.S. (2007).
Learning the value of information in an uncertain world. Nat. Neurosci. 10,
1214–1221.
Bejjanki, V.R., Beck, J.M., Lu, Z.-L., and Pouget, A. (2011). Perceptual learning
as improved probabilistic inference in early sensory areas. Nat. Neurosci. 14,
642–648.
Berkes, P., Orbán, G., Lengyel, M., and Fiser, J. (2011). Spontaneous cortical
activity reveals hallmarks of an optimal internal model of the environment. Sci-
ence 331, 83–87.
Bland, A.R., and Schaefer, A. (2012). Different varieties of uncertainty in human
decision-making. Front. Neurosci. 6, 85.
Chater, N., Tenenbaum, J.B., and Yuille, A. (2006). Probabilistic models of
cognition: conceptual foundations. Trends Cogn. Sci. 10, 287–291.
Costello, F., and Watts, P. (2014). Surprisingly rational: probability theory plus
noise explains biases in judgment. Psychol. Rev. 121, 463–480.
Courville, A.C., Gordon, G.J., Touretzky, D.S., and Daw, N.D. (2004). Model
uncertainty in classical conditioning. Adv. Neural Inf. Process. Syst. 16,
977–984.
d’Acremont, M., Schultz, W., and Bossaerts, P. (2013). The human brain en-
codes event frequencies while forming subjective beliefs. J. Neurosci. 33,
10887–10897.
Daunizeau, J., denOuden, H.E.M., Pessiglione, M., Kiebel, S.J., Stephan, K.E.,
and Friston, K.J. (2010). Observing the observer (I): meta-bayesian models of
learning and decision-making. PLoS ONE 5, e15554.
Daw, N.D., Niv, Y., and Dayan, P. (2005). Uncertainty-based competition be-
tween prefrontal and dorsolateral striatal systems for behavioral control. Nat.
Neurosci. 8, 1704–1711.
de Gardelle, V., and Mamassian, P. (2014). Does confidence use a common
currency across two visual tasks? Psychol. Sci. 25, 1286–1288.
De Martino, B., Fleming, S.M., Garrett, N., and Dolan, R.J. (2013). Confidence
in value-based choice. Nat. Neurosci. 16, 105–110.
Dehaene, S. (2014). Consciousness and the Brain: Deciphering How the Brain
Codes Our Thoughts (New York: Viking).
Dehaene, S., Charles, L., King, J.-R., and Marti, S. (2014). Toward a computa-
tional theory of conscious processing. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 25, 76–84.Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 89
Neuron
PerspectiveDeneve, S., Latham, P.E., and Pouget, A. (1999). Reading population codes: a
neural implementation of ideal observers. Nat. Neurosci. 2, 740–745.
Denison, S., Bonawitz, E., Gopnik, A., and Griffiths, T.L. (2013). Rational vari-
ability in children’s causal inferences: the Sampling Hypothesis. Cognition
126, 285–300.
DiCarlo, J.J., and Cox, D.D. (2007). Untangling invariant object recognition.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 11, 333–341.
Doya, K. (2002). Metalearning and neuromodulation. Neural Netw. 15, 495–506.
Drugowitsch, J., and Pouget, A. (2012). Probabilistic vs. non-probabilistic ap-
proaches to the neurobiology of perceptual decision-making. Curr. Opin. Neu-
robiol. 22, 963–969.
Ernst, M.O., and Banks, M.S. (2002). Humans integrate visual and haptic infor-
mation in a statistically optimal fashion. Nature 415, 429–433.
Fernandez-Duque, D., Baird, J.A., and Posner, M.I. (2000). Executive attention
and metacognitive regulation. Conscious. Cogn. 9, 288–307.
Fetsch, C.R., Kiani, R., Newsome, W.T., and Shadlen, M.N. (2014). Effects of
cortical microstimulation on confidence in a perceptual decision. Neuron 83,
797–804.
Fiser, J., Berkes, P., Orbán, G., and Lengyel, M. (2010). Statistically optimal
perception and learning: from behavior to neural representations. Trends
Cogn. Sci. 14, 119–130.
Fleming, S.M., and Dolan, R.J. (2010). Effects of loss aversion on post-deci-
sion wagering: implications for measures of awareness. Conscious. Cogn.
19, 352–363.
Fleming, S.M., and Dolan, R.J. (2012). The neural basis of metacognitive abil-
ity. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 367, 1338–1349.
Fleming, S.M., Weil, R.S., Nagy, Z., Dolan, R.J., and Rees, G. (2010). Relating
introspective accuracy to individual differences in brain structure. Science
329, 1541–1543.
Fleming, S.M., Dolan, R.J., and Frith, C.D. (2012). Metacognition: computa-
tion, biology and function. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 367,
1280–1286.
Fleming, S.M., Ryu, J., Golfinos, J.G., and Blackmon, K.E. (2014). Domain-
specific impairment in metacognitive accuracy following anterior prefrontal le-
sions. Brain 137, 2811–2822.
Fleming, S.M., Maniscalco, B., Ko, Y., Amendi, N., Ro, T., and Lau, H. (2015).
Action-specific disruption of perceptual confidence. Psychol. Sci. 26, 89–98.
Galvin, S.J., Podd, J.V., Drga, V., and Whitmore, J. (2003). Type 2 tasks in the
theory of signal detectability: discrimination between correct and incorrect de-
cisions. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 10, 843–876.
Gigerenzer, G., Hoffrage, U., and Kleinbölting, H. (1991). Probabilistic mental
models: a Brunswikian theory of confidence. Psychol. Rev. 98, 506–528.
Glimcher, P.W., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., and Poldrack, R.A. (2009). Introduction:
A brief history of neuroeconomics. In Neuroeconomics Decision Making and
the Brain, P.W. Glimcher, C.F. Camerer, E. Fehr, and R.A. Poldrack, eds.
(Elsevier).
Gold, J.I., and Shadlen, M.N. (2007). The neural basis of decision making.
Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 30, 535–574.
Graziano, M., and Sigman, M. (2009). The spatial and temporal construction of
confidence in the visual scene. PLoS ONE 4, e4909.
Griffin, D., and Tversky, A. (1992). The weighing of evidence and the determi-
nants of confidence. Cognit. Psychol. 24, 411–435.
Griffiths, T.L., Chater, N., Norris, D., and Pouget, A. (2012). How the Bayesians
got their beliefs (and what those beliefs actually are): comment on Bowers and
Davis (2012). Psychol. Bull. 138, 415–422.
Grimaldi, P., Lau, H., and Basso, M.A. (2015). There are things that we know
that we know, and there are things that we do not know we do not know: Con-
fidence in decision-making. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 55, 88–97.90 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.Hampton, R.R. (2001). Rhesus monkeys know when they remember. Proc.
Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 98, 5359–5362.
Hart, W., Tullett, A.M., Shreves, W.B., and Fetterman, Z. (2015). Fueling doubt
and openness: experiencing the unconscious, constructed nature of percep-
tion induces uncertainty and openness to change. Cognition 137, 1–8.
Hebart, M.N., Schriever, Y., Donner, T.H., and Haynes, J.-D. (2014). The Rela-
tionship between Perceptual Decision Variables and confidence in the human
brain. Cereb. Cortex. Published online August 11, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.
1093/cercor/bhu181.
Hinton, G.E., and Dayan, P. (1996). Varieties of Helmholtz machine. Neural
Netw. 9, 1385–1403.
Hoyer, P.O., and Hyvärinen, A. (2003). Interpreting neural response variability
as Monte Carlo sampling of the posterior. Adv. Neural Inf. Process. Syst. 15,
277–284.
Jarvstad, A., Hahn, U., Rushton, S.K., andWarren, P.A. (2013). Perceptuo-mo-
tor, cognitive, and description-based decision-making seem equally good.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 110, 16271–16276.
Jaynes, E.T. (2003). Probability Theory: The Logic of Science (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press).
Juslin, P.,Winman, A., andHansson, P. (2007). The naı̈ve intuitive statistician: a
naı̈ve sampling model of intuitive confidence intervals. Psychol. Rev. 114,
678–703.
Kahneman, D. (2013). Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux).
Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A. (1982). Variants of uncertainty. Cognition 11,
143–157.
Karelitz, T.M., and Budescu, D.V. (2004). You say ‘‘probable’’ and I say ‘‘likely’’:
improving interpersonal communication with verbal probability phrases.
J. Exp. Psychol. Appl. 10, 25–41.
Kepecs, A., and Mainen, Z.F. (2012). A computational framework for the study
of confidence in humans and animals. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci.
367, 1322–1337.
Kepecs, A., Uchida, N., Zariwala, H.A., and Mainen, Z.F. (2008). Neural corre-
lates, computation and behavioural impact of decision confidence. Nature
455, 227–231.
Kiani, R., and Shadlen, M.N. (2009). Representation of confidence associated
with a decision by neurons in the parietal cortex. Science 324, 759–764.
Kiani, R., Corthell, L., and Shadlen, M.N. (2014). Choice certainty is informed
by both evidence and decision time. Neuron 84, 1329–1342.
Kim, B., and Basso, M.A. (2010). A probabilistic strategy for understanding ac-
tion selection. J. Neurosci. 30, 2340–2355.
King, J.-R., and Dehaene, S. (2014). A model of subjective report and objective
discrimination as categorical decisions in a vast representational space.
Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 369, 20130204.
Knill, D.C., and Pouget, A. (2004). The Bayesian brain: the role of uncertainty in
neural coding and computation. Trends Neurosci. 27, 712–719.
Komura, Y., Nikkuni, A., Hirashima, N., Uetake, T., and Miyamoto, A. (2013).
Responses of pulvinar neurons reflect a subject’s confidence in visual catego-
rization. Nat. Neurosci. 16, 749–755.
Körding, K.P., and Wolpert, D.M. (2004). Bayesian integration in sensorimotor
learning. Nature 427, 244–247.
Koriat, A. (2012). The self-consistency model of subjective confidence. Psy-
chol. Rev. 119, 80–113.
Lak, A., Costa, G.M., Romberg, E., Koulakov, A.A., Mainen, Z.F., and Kepecs,
A. (2014). Orbitofrontal cortex is required for optimal waiting based on decision
confidence. Neuron 84, 190–201.
Lee, T.S., andMumford, D. (2003). Hierarchical Bayesian inference in the visual
cortex. J. Opt. Soc. Am. A Opt. Image Sci. Vis. 20, 1434–1448.
Neuron
PerspectiveLegenstein, R., and Maass, W. (2014). Ensembles of spiking neurons with
noise support optimal probabilistic inference in a dynamically changing envi-
ronment. PLoS Comput. Biol. 10, e1003859.
Ma,W.J., and Jazayeri, M. (2014). Neural coding of uncertainty and probability.
Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 37, 205–220.
Ma, W.J., Beck, J.M., Latham, P.E., and Pouget, A. (2006). Bayesian inference
with probabilistic population codes. Nat. Neurosci. 9, 1432–1438.
Maloney, L.T., and Zhang, H. (2010). Decision-theoretic models of visual
perception and action. Vision Res. 50, 2362–2374.
Mathys, C., Daunizeau, J., Friston, K.J., and Stephan, K.E. (2011). A bayesian
foundation for individual learning under uncertainty. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 5, 39.
McGuire, J.T., Nassar, M.R., Gold, J.I., and Kable, J.W. (2014). Functionally
dissociable influences on learning rate in a dynamic environment. Neuron
84, 870–881.
Meyniel, F., Schlunegger, D., and Dehaene, S. (2015). The sense of confidence
during probabilistic learning: a normative account. PLoS Comput. Biol. 11,
e1004305.
Middlebrooks, P.G., and Sommer, M.A. (2012). Neuronal correlates of meta-
cognition in primate frontal cortex. Neuron 75, 517–530.
Murakami, M., Vicente, M.I., Costa, G.M., and Mainen, Z.F. (2014). Neural an-
tecedents of self-initiated actions in secondary motor cortex. Nat. Neurosci.
17, 1574–1582.
Nassar, M.R., Wilson, R.C., Heasly, B., and Gold, J.I. (2010). An approximately
Bayesian delta-rule model explains the dynamics of belief updating in a chang-
ing environment. J. Neurosci. 30, 12366–12378.
O’Reilly, J.X., Jbabdi, S., Rushworth, M.F.S., and Behrens, T.E.J. (2013). Brain
systems for probabilistic and dynamic prediction: computational specificity
and integration. PLoS Biol. 11, e1001662.
Patel, D., Fleming, S.M., and Kilner, J.M. (2012). Inferring subjective states
through the observation of actions. Proc. Biol. Sci. 279, 4853–4860.
Payzan-LeNestour, E., and Bossaerts, P. (2011). Risk, unexpected uncer-
tainty, and estimation uncertainty: Bayesian learning in unstable settings.
PLoS Comput. Biol. 7, e1001048.
Pearl, J. (1997). Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Networks of
Plausible Inference (Morgan Kaufmann).
Peirce, C.S., and Jastrow, J. (1884). On small differences in sensation. Mem.
Natl. Acad. Sci. 3, 75–83.
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Rose, M., Haider, H., and Büchel, C. (2005). Unconscious detection of implicit
expectancies. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 17, 918–927.
Schlaghecken, F., Stürmer, B., and Eimer, M. (2000). Chunking processes in
the learning of event sequences: electrophysiological indicators. Mem. Cognit.
28, 821–831.
Sergent, C., Baillet, S., and Dehaene, S. (2005). Timing of the brain events un-
derlying access to consciousness during the attentional blink. Nat. Neurosci.
8, 1391–1400.
Shea,N., Boldt, A., Bang,D., Yeung,N., Heyes,C., and Frith, C.D. (2014). Supra-
personal cognitive control and metacognition. Trends Cogn. Sci. 18, 186–193.
Smith, P.L., and Vickers, D. (1988). The accumulator model of two-choice
discrimination. J. Math. Psychol. 32, 135–168.
Smith, J.D., Shields, W.E., and Washburn, D.A. (2003). The comparative psy-
chology of uncertainty monitoring and metacognition. Behav. Brain Sci. 26,
317–339, discussion 340–373.
Soltani, A., and Wang, X.-J. (2010). Synaptic computation underlying probabi-
listic inference. Nat. Neurosci. 13, 112–119.
Solway, A., and Botvinick, M.M. (2012). Goal-directed decision making as
probabilistic inference: a computational framework and potential neural corre-
lates. Psychol. Rev. 119, 120–154.
Summerfield, C., and de Lange, F.P. (2014). Expectation in perceptual deci-
sion making: neural and computational mechanisms. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 15,
745–756.
Timmermans, B., Schilbach, L., Pasquali, A., and Cleeremans, A. (2012).
Higher order thoughts in action: consciousness as an unconscious re-descrip-
tion process. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 367, 1412–1423.
Todorov, E. (2004). Optimality principles in sensorimotor control. Nat. Neuro-
sci. 7, 907–915.
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics
and biases. Science 185, 1124–1131.
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